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Abstract
The present paper investigates the portfolio allocation decisions of an investor with inﬁnite horizon
when available ﬁnancial assets differ in their degrees of liquidity. A model with risk neutral agents
allows us to endogenously determine the liquidity premium. With risk averse agents, we develop
a nontrivial portfolio allocation problem, which enables us to calculate the demand for an illiquid
asset for any given yield premium. We calibrate and numerically simulate both models. Reasonable
parameter values imply a liquidity premium of 1.7% for the risk neutral case. In the portfolio allocation
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The purpose of this paper is to examine portfolio investment decisions when available ﬁnan-
cial asset markets differ in their degrees of liquidity. It is a common observation that liquidity
properties vary across ﬁnancial markets. In our view liquidity is one of the fundamental de-
terminants of portfolio investment decisions, comparable in its importance to more standard
and better studied determinants, such as risk and return (consumption CAPM, see Lucas,
1978, Merton, 1971, for instance).
Throughout we assume that liquidity refers to the ease with which an asset can be sold.
Thus an asset (or asset market) is liquid if trade can take place at short notice in large quanti-
ties without a substantial price change. Out of these three aspects of liquidity, that is at short
notice, in large quantities and without a substantial discount, we will mostly focus on the ﬁrst
one. The source of illiquidity of an asset will be the difﬁculty of ﬁnding a trading partner
immediately when the necessity of trade is realized by the agent. Since trading is not always
possible, one expects that in equilibrium a less liquid asset will carry a higher yield premium
relative to a more liquid one.
In this paper we maintain the view that the utility possibilities set is not time invariant,
rather during certain periods consumption is more rewarding than at other times. One reason
might be that consumption is not inﬁnitely divisible, but takes place in large pieces. In that
case, the availability of a large piece of good at a reasonable price might correspond to the
aforementioned liquidity shock. Alternatively, the utility stemming from a given level of
consumption may vary over the life cycle (marriage, children, vacation). A third argument
would be that from time to time agents have a favorable private investment opportunity. In
short, agents are sometimes faced with liquidity shocks (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), and
for the duration of the shock consumption has higher marginal utility.
Given the presence of liquidity shocks and the difﬁculty of selling illiquid assets immedi-
ately, agents will face a non-trivial trade off in their portfolio allocation decisions. Namely,
holding a less liquid asset will yield a higher premium; on the other hand, it makes the agent
more vulnerable to liquidity shocks, because when a shock comes, she ﬁnds it more difﬁcult
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1to liquidate asset holdings. The analysis of this trade off is the main purpose of the present
paper.
A prominent example of illiquid ﬁnancial markets is emerging country bond markets. It is
a general observation that government bonds issued by developing country governments are
sold at signiﬁcant discounts compared to those issued by developed country governments.
Consumption based theories have difﬁculties in explaining such a yield premium, as the co-
variance of these returns with world or “rich world” consumption is negligible. An alternative
explanation could be based on other characteristics of these markets, such as their relative
illiquidity compared to developed country treasury markets. One study in this direction is
Benczúr (2001), who empirically attempts to identify part of the premium that is caused
by illiquidity on emerging country government bonds. Motivated by this study, we aim at
calibrating the liquidity premium in our main model to these empirical estimates, and exam-
ine what kind of portfolio investment behavior it applies. In this sense, our approach is not
dissimilar to Merton (1971), who studies the portfolio decision problem of a representative
investor under uncertainty, and calibrates the model to the empirically relevant risk premium
(equity premium). Insofar as stock markets are illiquid, the present approach might also have
some value added concerning the equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott, 1985). As
to illiquid non-ﬁnancial markets, we believe the most prominent example is the real estate
market. Although our focus is more on ﬁnancial markets, the present approach can be read-
ily applied, indeed calibrated to real estate markets. (See Williams, 1995 for a recent asset
pricing model of real assets.)
We are not aware of any other paper in the literature that studies portfolio investment under
liquidity risk. However, there are a number of papers that examine the causes and conse-
quences of market liquidity or the lack of it. Holmström and Tirole (1998) present a liquidity
based asset pricing model where the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of corporate
entities governs the liquidity premium (similarly to consumption CAPM). This paper is re-
lated to our baseline model, to be presented in the next section; but it does not study portfolio
investment decisions like we do in Section 3. Lippman and McCall (1986) characterize liq-
uidity as the expected waiting time before trade provided that trade is optimal. Implicit in
their setting is that trade is sometimes suboptimal; this paper makes the harsher assumption
that trade is sometimes impossible. However, rational agents do not trade suboptimally, thus
our impossibility requirement is only seemingly stronger than theirs. Again they do not study
portfolio decisions. There is a considerable amount of literature on market microstructure,
that studies the possible determinants of liquidity; Campbell, Lo and MacKinley (1997) is a
good overview.
The main driving force of our model is the recurring needs for liquidity. There are several
ways to formalize these needs. In a model by Baldwin and Meyer (1979), investment oppor-
tunities with different rate of return arrive at stochastic intervals. This formulation is very
2much similar to what we adopt in Section 2. Liquidity shocks were introduced in Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) as taste shocks, since then their basic setting has become a standard in the
literature. A Diamond–Dybvig type liquidity shock in period t implies that the marginal rate
of substitution between that period and any other becomes inﬁnite, so that the agent wants to
consume all her wealth immediately. The liquidity shocks of the present paper are less stark
then this; a liquidity shock does switch the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution, but it
will always be ﬁnite (excluding zero consumption).
The least standard assumption of the present paper is that trade is sometimes impossible.
We tend to think about this assumption as a parable that represents one aspect of illiquidity.
One expects that no asset is impossible to sell if the price discount is large enough. However,
if the discount is too high, it may be optimal to wait, as in Lippman and McCall (1986).
Additionally, the present framework will allow us to calculate the discount on a hypotetical
immediate sale that makes the agent exactly indifferent between trading immediately and
waiting for a potential counterparty with whom trade takes place at the “correct” price. In
this sense the present approach is capable of calculating the price discount corresponding to
instant sale due to liquidity reasons; thus it can be interpreted as a ﬁrst step in endogeniz-
ing the liquidity or noise traders present in several models of ﬁnancial markets (e.g., Kyle,
1985). The reason why we focus on one particular aspect of illiquidity is mainly technical.
The assumption that trade is possible only occasionally makes our analysis more tractable.
Nevertheless, we feel that introducing a price discount would not change qualitatively our
results. Indeed, in our framework waiting is equivalent to some price discount as the above
reasoning shows. Although the fact that trading is not always possible is exogenously im-
posed in the model, Appendix A demonstrates how it might endogenously arise. The idea is
that of adverse selection; under certain informational conditions a market may fail to operate.
A similar story could be incorporated into our main model too, but it would unnecessarily
complicate the analysis, and our main focus is more on the consequences of illiquidity on
investment behavior.
The issue of liquidity that we study here is also related to models of portfolio choice with
transaction costs. If illiquidity means that immediate sale incurs a discount relative to the
fundamentally justiﬁed price of the asset, this is technically similar to having a proportional
transaction cost on trading the illiquid asset. Here we discuss some of the transaction cost
literature relevant to our problem. Constantinides (1986) considers a portfolio allocation
problem with two assets, one of which is traded with a proportional transaction cost. He
shows that even high transaction costs have little effect on the expected yield of the “illiquid”
asset because trade only occurs infrequently and in only inﬁnitesimal amounts. Dumas and
Luciano (1991) analyze a different framework, in which the investor only consumes at a ter-
minal date, there are thus less effects shifting the portfolio balance away from the optimal. In
their model, trade is even more infrequent, making the impact of transaction costs on returns
3small. The effect of transaction cost in these models is of second order because portfolio bal-
ance evolves continuously and the trade necessary to restore the balance to optimal is rare and
small. In our model, liquidity events call for a sudden and large adjustment in the portfolio,
thereby raising the loss from illiquidity. Our framework is thus similar to that of Grossman
and Laroque (1990), where transaction costs of adjusting the level of durable consumption
causes the investor to trade infrequently and in large amounts. In contrast to the above papers,
Grossman and Laroque ﬁnd that transaction costs have a substantial effect on the demand for
ﬁnancial assets (and, in equilibrium, on their return). Instead of real transaction costs, Gabaix
and Laibson (2001) study the effect of decision costs on portfolio allocation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our baseline model of
investment under illiquidity. The baseline model will involve risk neutral agents, therefore
the issue of portfolio investment is extremely simple. Nevertheless, this model will be useful
for two reasons. The ﬁrst is that it is analytically solvable in closed form. The second is
that consumption based pricing will imply an unambiguous liquidity premium on the illiquid
asset, a property we shall lose when we later move to risk averse agents. This section will also
present some elementary calibration results, and we ﬁnd that reasonable parameter values can
imply a non-negligible (1-2%) liquidity premium. Section 3, in its turn, presents a similar
model with risk averse agents. Once the utility function is concave, the portfolio decision
problemoftheagentbecomesnontrivial. Thereforewehavetorelyonnumericalsimulations.
Our simulation approach is based on the iteration of the Bellman equation. We also attempt
to calibrate the model with reasonable ﬁgures and study the implications. Finally, Section
4 concludes. Appendix A presents a simple model that endogenizes our assumption about
trade not being always possible. Appendix B contains the details of the numerical simulation
of the main model.
2. Risk Neutral Agents
We develop a simple partial equilibrium continuous-time model of asset liquidity and study
the endogenously arising liquidity premium. The agents in our model are risk neutral, and





where ct is the instantenous consumption ﬂow at time t, r is the rate of time preference, and
E0 denotes expectation formed at time 0. There are two assets and one consumption good
(the numeraire) in this economy. The liquid asset is instantly tradeble at any point in time,
and one unit of it has a market price of ert at time t (in terms of the consumption good). The
model will endogenously pin down the equilibrium value of r.
4The “illiquid” asset provides an inﬁnite dividend stream of one unit of the consumption
good at each time instant. This asset is illiquid in the sense that buyers are not necessarrily
available at any point in time. More precisely, potential buyers of the asset arrive according
to the jumps of a Poisson process. Thus a seller might be in a situation where there is no
instant demand for her asset supply. However, the asset can be bought at any point in time at
the endogenously determined market price p.
Additionally, during certain favorable time periods, an agent has an alternative investment
opportunity, which is more attractive than the liquid asset. This opportunity again arrives at
a Poisson rate, and is available for a random, exponential time period (the parameters of the
three exponential distributions can differ). While it is available, this opportunity provides a
dividend stream of y units of the consumption good per each unit invested. We assume that y
is large enough such that the return on this investment dominates both assets in the economy.
The alternative investment opportunity is not meant to be taken literally and can be inter-
preted in several ways. For instance the agent may have abrupt liquidity needs from time
to time due to some exogenous reason. In that case, y would represent the ﬂow cost of not
obtaining sufﬁcient liquidity. Technically speaking, the alternative investment is a means of
introducing a time varying random pattern of liquidity needs for the agent. To be consitent,
we will use the favorable investment opportunity interpretation below.
The two assets in the economy are priced to the consumption good; we assume that when-
ever there is no alternative investment, the agent is indifferent between holding the liquid as-
set, holding the illiquid asset or consuming all of her wealth. Since the agent is risk-neutral,
this equilibrium condition also corresponds to the possibilty of an interior equilibrium.
Intuitively, if there was no alternative investment in the model, the agent would be in-
different between consumption and investment in the liquid asset only if r was equal to r.
However, the possibility of a favorable investment at a future date would then make the liquid
asset more attractive relative to consumption; in order to compensate for this affect we expect
that in equilibrium r < r. To put it differently, the liquid asset has a lower return because it
provides a means of preserving wealth for future liquidity needs. The difference r−r can
be interpreted as a discount on the yield of the liquid asset. This yield discount arises from
the asset being a means of storing value and having the capacity of instant liquidity provi-
sion when needed. This yield discount corresponds the liquidity discount in the example of
Holmström and Tirole (1998).
In contrast, the illiquid asset cannot be sold immediately should good times come. This
implies that the agent may incur an opportunity cost because of not being able to invest in
the alternative when it is available, as she cannot liquidate her asset holdings. To compensate
for this opportunity cost, we expect that in equilibrium the illiquid asset commands a higher
return than the liquid; that is, 1/p > r. The difference between the two, 1/p−r, is what we
will call the liquidity premium in this model.
5In the following we turn to formally characterize the equilibrium and in particular derive
prices and returns.
2.1. SOLUTION
We determine the equilibrium by means of dynamic programming. First let us solve for the
equilibrium value of r, the return on the liquid asset. Let VL (L for “liquid”) denote the
lifetime utility stemming from holding one unit of the liquid asset, given that there is no
current alternative investment opportunity. In other words, this is the utility along the optimal
consumption plan of an agent who has a single unit of the liquid asset. Since the utility
function is homogenous of degree one, holding several units of the asset yields proportionally
higher utility.
Similarly, VE (E for “enjoy”) denotes the lifetime value of holding one unit of the alter-
native asset, given that it is available. This value also has the homogeneity property in the
quantity of the asset.
We have the following Bellman equations.
rVL = rVL+µ(VE−VL) (1a)
rVE = y+l(VL−VE) (1b)
The ﬁrst equation says that the subjective loss from holding the asset for one more instant
should equal the instantenous capital gain on the asset (rVL) plus the expected gain from
being able to buy the alternative asset. The alternative opportunity arrives with instantenous
probability µ (that is, µ is the parameter of the exponential distribution) and yields a total
utility of VE. The second equation can be interpreted similarly. In that case the dividend
y is assumed to be a ﬂow of utility, in particular, it cannot be reinvested. The hazard rate
corresponding to the termination of the alternative opportunity is denoted by l.
Inequilibriumtheagentisindifferentwhethertoholdtheliquidassetorsellitandconsume
the proceeds immediately. This implies that
VL = 1. (2)





As long as y > r, that is, the alternative investment is preferred to immediate consumption,
we have r < r. This corresponds to the yield discount on the liquid asset anticipated in the
previous section. The comparative statics of the discount is straightforward. An increase in µ
6corresponds to more frequent arrival of the alternative, hence a larger discount. An increase
in l shortens the duration of the alternative, thus lowering the discount. Finally, an increase
in y raises the discount.
Let us now turn to the illiquid asset. Again, we make use of dynamic programming. The
owner of an illiquid asset can ﬁnd herself in three possible states. The ﬁrst is when she holds
the asset without having the alternative. Let VN (N for “no alternative”) denote her value in
this state per unit of asset held. The second state is when she has an alternative but is unable
to liquidate her asset as there is no potential buyer. Her value in this state VW (W for “wait”)
per unit of asset. The third state corresponds to holding the alternative asset. The agent’s
value in this states isVE per unit of the alternative asset. As the reader may expect, this value
will be the same as theVE deﬁned in (1b). Finally, let p denote the time invariant price of the
illiquid asset in terms of the consumption good.
The Bellman equations are as follows.
rVN = 1+µ(VW−VN) (4a)
rVW = 1+h(pVE−VW)+l(VN−VW) (4b)
rVE = y+l(VN/p−VE) (4c)
The ﬁrst equation says that the instantenous dividend plus the expected gain in value due to
the arrival of the alternative should compensate the agent for holding the asset for another
instant. The second equation refers to the state when the agent is waiting for a buyer. In
that case the last two terms on the right hand side represent the expected gains from ﬁnding a
buyer (with instantenous probability h) respectively the expected loss of losing the alternative
(with probability l). Since one unit of the illiquid asset buys p units of the alternative, we
have pVE in the second term. The third equation can interpreted similarly.
Our equilibrium condition is that when there is no alternative, the agent is indifferent be-
tween buying one unit of the illiquid asset and consuming the price. This implies
p =VN. (5)













7Note that as long as y>r, the liquidity premium is positive. In the following, we will assume
that this holds.
The comparative statics are as follows. An increase in y makes the alternative more attrac-
tive thereby raising the liquidity premium. An increase in µ corresponds to more frequent
arrival of the alternative and hence raises the premium. A higher l represents shorter ex-
pected duration of the alternative investment opportunity, thus lowering the gains from liq-
uidity. Therefore the premium is smaller. A rise in h means that buyers arrive more often,
thus the premium decreases. Also note that we have
lim
h→¥
p = 0, (8)
that is, if a buyer is available immediately then there is no premium.
2.2. CALIBRATION
To get a sense of magnitudes, we tried to calibrate the model. The following parameter values
will serve as a benchmark. Time is measured in years.
r µ l h y
0.1 2 26 120 1.27
These values imply r = 0.010 and p = 0.017, that is, a real rate of return of approximately
1% and a liquidity premium of 1.7%. The parameter values can be interpreted as follows.
A discount rate of r=0.1 leads to a discount factor of 0.90, which seems like a fair number
for one year. The arrival rate of the alternative, µ = 2, means that liquidity events occur every
six months on average. A l of 26 means that the expected duration of the alternative is two
weeks. For h = 120, buyers arrive every three days on average. Finally, y = 1.27 implies that
whenever the liquidity event occurs, a one-day delay in satisfying the liquidity needs leads to
a loss equivalent to 0.3% of the amount required.
The next step is to check the sensitivity of the results. Our strategy is the following. Out of
the ﬁve parameters, we ﬁx three at the benchmark values and vary the fourth one. The ﬁfth
is chosen such that the implied real interest rate, r = 0.01. The implicitly determined ﬁfth
parameter will always be y.
Figures 1 through 4 display the results of our calibration. We ﬁnd that even a small amount
of illiquidity implies a non negligible liquidity premium. This ﬁnding seems to be robust
across parameters.
83. Portfolio Choice
With risk neutral agents, the problem of portfolio choice is extremely simple: in equilibrium
agents have to be indifferent to holding the two different assets otherwise the demand for the
less preferred asset becomes zero. If the consumer is risk averse, however, then the portfolio
choice becomes non-trivial. In particular, for every price differential (or, equivalently, yield
premium) there is a well-deﬁned relative demand for the two assets.1 Then the relative supply
is needed to pin down the price difference. In this section we derive the relative demand for
the liquid and the illiquid assets.
We adopt the standard constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, C1−q/(1−
q), because it will allow us to abstract from the wealth level of the consumer and concen-













where B0 is the amount of bond, M0 is the amount of cash held at time 0, Ct is total con-
sumption at time t, and ct is a time-dependent taste parameter, ct = 1 at “normal” times and
ct = g > 1 at liquidity events. g > 1 means that the marginal utility of consumption is higher
in case of liquidity events than at normal times so the consumer wishes to consume more than
at normal times. In the following we will denote V(B,M,1) by VN(B,M) (N for “normal”)
andV(B,M,g) by VE(B,M) (E for “event”).
The evolution of state variables is given by
dM = [(r+p)B+rM−C] dt +S,
dB = −S.
During a dt length of time, the bond pays a coupon of r+p per unit, and the cash pays
interest r (p is the “liquidity premium”). Only cash holdings can be consumed, otherwise
there would be no liquidity problem. At times of trade, the agent can buy and sell both
cash and bond but cannot borrow or short-sell any of the assets (M,B > 0). This means the
agents are liquidity constrained and cannot consume more than the amount of cash at hand.
The amount of bond sold is denoted by S (≷ 0). Similarly to the framework in the previous
section, trading opportunities arrive at an exponential rate, h.
Note that the bond is assumed to pay the coupon in cash. This ensures that the amount of
bond between trades is constant, which will simplify the analysis.
1. We will refer to the liquid asset as “cash” and to the illiquid asset as “bond.” The reader should
bear in mind the alternative interpretations outlined in the introduction.
9As in the previous section, we assume that liquidity events (ct = g) arrive according to
a Poisson process with arrival rate µ, and end with a rate l. Then we have the following
Bellman equation for the two states.






























¶MVk(B,M) in state k.
In optimum, the subjective loss from waiting another instant is perfectly offset by the
ﬂow utility from consumption and the expected capital gain. The amount of cash changes
by (r+p)B+rM −C at any instant of time changing the value function by VM dM.2 With
instantenous probability h, a trade occurs, and the portfolio is rebalanced optimally. With
probability µ, the state switches from normal to liquidity event state from which it switches
back with probability l. Since the change in cash is of order dt, we can ignore it as dt → 0 in
the case of trade and the two state changes, because the probability of these events is of order
dt, too.
It is straightforward to show that both value functions are homogenous of degree 1−q.
Let us introduce the following notations: m = M/B, c =C/B, s = S/B, vN(m) =VN(1,m),
and vE(m) =VE(1,m). For this we need that B is nonzero, which is shown by the following
argument.
Suppose that the consumer never buys any bonds when she is faced with a trade oppor-
tunity, that is, Bt ≡ 0. The the problem is a modiﬁed “eat-the-pie” problem, in which the
amount of cash is consumed gradually over the inﬁnite horizon. Because zero consumption
is prohibitively undesirable (recall that u0(c) → ¥ as c → 0) and the there is no other source
of income, there is always an amount of cash left over, C < M. Then the loss from buying
a small amount of bond is only of second order, because it does not constrain the consumer
in her consumption possibilities. The gain, however, is of ﬁrst order, since the bond yields a
positive premium over cash. Hence it is not optimal to hold no bond.
By the homogeneity property, we have that
V(B,M) = v(m)B1−q
VM(B,M) = v0(m)B−q
2. Recall that M is of bounded variation and thus no higher order terms enter.

































Maximum is characterized by the following ﬁrst order condition:
v0(m∗)(m∗+1)+(q−1)v(m∗) = 0. (12)
Observe that M+B (nominal wealth) is constant in a market trade, so the optimal m∗
N does
not depend on M or B, it is a constant.
Solving for optimal consumption requires the following ﬁrst order condition (assuming












Note that unless v is linear, the optimal consumption depends on the cash–bond ratio nontriv-
ially.





























(13a) and (13b) constitute a system of two ﬁrst-order ordinary differential equations. The
family of solutions is thus two-dimensional. We have altogether four unknown constants: the
two constants of integration and the two m∗s. The two ﬁrst order conditions in (12) provide








Given all the parameter values, we can numerically solve for the relative demands for
the assets, m∗
N and m∗
E.3 We anticipate that m∗
E > m∗
N, since consumption is higher under a
liquidity event and the consumer needs more cash to ﬁnance it. In this case, when a liquidity
shock occurs, the consumer wishes to sell some of her bonds to provide the higher cash–bond
ratio. Because trade is not immediately possible, the agent consumes less than optimal in the
beginning of the liquidity event. This makes her worse off, so she demands a yield premium
for holding the illiquid asset. Alternatively, for a given premium, she holds less of the asset.
As a limiting case, if trade occurs instantly (h → ¥), the liquidity premium is zero, or, to put
it differently, a positive premium implies inﬁnite relative demand for the bond.
To obtain an alternative measure of illiquidity, let us turn to the case of a selling discount.
So far we have measured illiquidity as the average time of waiting until trade. It is important
to note that earlier trade is not necessarily impossible, it may be simply suboptimal. If selling
at short notice involves a substantial price discount (either because the market is thin relative
to the size of the sell order, or because uninformed buyers believe that the sell order is a result
of an adverse fundamental shock, see Appendix A below) then the seller may ﬁnd it optimal
to wait until she can trade at a more favorable price (by placing the order gradually, or waiting
for a more informed buyer).
Once we have solved for the value functions, we are able to calculate the discount at which
the consumer would not trade in a liquidity event even if immediate trade was possible. As-
sume that the agent holds a portfolio optimal for normal times (m∗
N) when the liquidity shock
3. Appendix B describes the numerical technique used. Even though we apply a discrete-time itera-
tion procedure, we ﬁnd it simpler to show the algebra in continous time.
12occurs. Then her utility is
vE(m∗
N)B1−q.
Suppose she can sell the bond instantly at price p0 ≤ 1. Her utility from doing so is
vE(m∗
E)(B−S)1−q,






































So if the price is below ˜ p, the consumer is better off waiting an expected 1/h amount of time
till it recovers to p. Throughout the calibration of the model, we will also report the discount,
(1− ˜ p), at which the agent is unwilling to sell immediately. This enables us to get a better
picture of how much illiquidity the agent really faces when deciding on the timing of sale.
There is a clear link between the volatility of the price of the asset and its liquidity. In
particular, if the price of the bond is highly volatile, the consumer may wish to wait for
a better price and hence delay consumption after a liquidity shock. By incorporating the
seller’s search for an optimal price in the model, we would be able to investigate the effect of
volatility on the liquidity premium. We do not address this question in the present paper but
it is a candidate for future research.
3.1. NUMERICAL SOLUTION
We solve the above optimization problem numerically as described in the Appendix. Here
we only report the solution for a few parameter values, more detailed calibration results and
sensitivity check will follow.
The following parameter values serve as a benchmark. Although we use daily numbers in
the iteration, here we report annualized values.
13r µ l h g q r p
0.1 2 26 120 4 0.9 0 0.01
Recall the interpretation of the parameters from Section 2.2. A discount rate of r = 0.1
leads to a discount factor of 0.90. The arrival rate, µ = 2, means that liquidity events occur
everysixmonthsonaverage. Alof26meansthattheexpecteddurationoftheliquidityshock
is two weeks. For h = 120, buyers arrive every three days on average. g = 4 means that at a
liquidity event the marginal propensity to consume is four times higher than at normal times.
q = 0.9 implies relatively little risk aversion and a high degree of intertemporal substitution.
r = 0 and p = 0.01 mean that the real rate of interest is zero and the bond commands a
one-percent liquidity premium.
These values imply m∗
N = 0.098, m∗
E = 0.161, and (1− ˜ p) = 0.028. That is, the consumer
holds 8.9% (= m∗
N/(1+m∗
N)) of her wealth in cash at normal times, and 13.9% during liq-
uidity events. This conﬁrms are conjecture that the arrival of a taste shock raises the optimal
cash–bond ratio. The consumer consumes roughly 10% of her liquid wealth each day. This
number does not change substantially with the actual cash–bond ratio. This implies that total
consumption responds substantially to the amount of liquid asset holdings, and is about twice
as high during liquidity events than at normal times. The discount at which the investor is in-
different between immediate sale and waiting is 2.8%. This seems not to be an unreasonable
magnitude: an immediate sell order from a large investor in an illiquid market might result in
such a discount.
If we increase the measure of illiquidity to an average ﬁve days (h=72), the results change
in the anticipated direction. The optimal cash–bond ratios are m∗
N = 0.148 and m∗
E = 0.247,
implying that the agent holds 12.9% of her total wealth in cash during normal times, and
19.8% at liquidity shocks, that is, she demands less of the illiquid asset in both states. Such a
decrease in the liquidity of the bond lowers its demand by 5–7% for a given nominal wealth
and a given yield premium. The optimal consumption is around 8% of liquid wealth, meaning
that the consumer saves more so that she can offset the increased illiquidity of the bond. The
discount threshold is now 3.8%; selling at this discount or waiting an average ﬁve days are
equally bad for the asset holder.
Tables 1 through 3 display the calibration results for a number of parameter values. The
ﬁrst column reports the parameter varied, all the other parameters are ﬁxed at the benchmark
value. We report the share of liquid assets in the portfolio during normal times and liquidity
events, the discount at which the consumer is indifferent to immediate sale, and the share of
the 1% liquidity premium that is explained by liquidity events. This number is calculated
as follows. When a liquidity shock occurs, the consumer is willing to sell her illiquid asset
at the given discount. She does not sell all of her bonds, only a fraction required to set the
optimal cash–bond balance. Waiting for the sale to take place is equivalent to suffering a loss
14of the given discount for the above fraction of bonds. This loss is incurred µ times a year on
average. In the last column of the tables, this annual average loss is reported in percentage
points. The remainder of the 1% premium compensates the loss from everyday, small trades.
This number gives us a sense of how much the taste shocks are relevant in explaining the
liquidity premium.
Table 1 shows that and increasing waiting time (decreasing h) reduces the demand for
the illiquid asset. We also ﬁnd that the more illiquid the asset is, the higher fraction of the
liquidity premium is explained by the taste shocks. Table 2 demonstrates that the role of taste
shocks moves very closely with their size. There is an unexpected ﬁnding, however. We
see that, contrary to our ﬁrst intuition, higher liquidity shocks decrease the demand for the
liquid assets. This is because the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is quite large (recall
the q = 0.9 < 1). The consumer is willing to redistribute a large amount of consumption
from normal times to times of liquidity events. She consumes very little during normal times
and hence does not need much liquid wealth. We also see this effect at work when varying
the frequency of taste shocks (see Table 3). In order to get rid of the dominance of the
substitution effect, we will need to consider lower (and more realistic) values of intertemporal
substitution.
4. Conclusion
We developed two simple models of portfolio decision under illiquidity. The ﬁrst model
implied an endogenously arising liquidity premium of 1.7% for reasonable parameter values.
The second model enabled us to investigate the portfolio allocation decision of a risk averse
agent with illiquid assets. Preliminary calibration suggests that if the average time to sell
is three days, a mildly risk averse agent holds 8.9% of her wealth in liquid assets during
normal times and 13.9% during liquidity events. If waiting time increases to ﬁve days then
these ratios go up to 12.9% and 19.8%, respectively, meaning that the demand for the illiquid
asset decreases by 5–7%. The price discount that makes the asset holder indifferent between
immediate sale and waiting is 2.8% for an average waiting of three days and 3.8% for ﬁve
days. A thorough calibration exercise is to be accomplished. Still, the preliminary results
seem reasonable, and they reinforce our claim that a small variation in illiquidity can cause
substantial change in the optimal portfolio allocation.
Directions for further research include incorporating fundamental risk into the model in
order to study how the interaction of illiquidity and uncertainty modiﬁes portfolio invest-
ment decisions and whether any of the two might be a dominant factor. Additionally, a fully
satisfactory model might allow for endogenously arising illiquidity (but see Appendix A).
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A Asymmetric Information and Illiquidity
Here we develop a simple matching model with informational asymmetry that endogenously implies
the impossibility of asset trade at certain dates. The idea is that buyers sometimes cannot distinguish
between sale implied by liquidity reasons and sale implied by weak fundamentals. In that case they
might be reluctant to buy at a high price; and at a low price the seller is not interested in trading, thus
the market collapses.
Time is discrete, agents are risk neutral. The seller has all of her wealth invested into one unit of
the illiquid asset, and wishes to sell it to a buyer. Potential buyers arrive at each date. Buyers may
or may not have full information about the asset. A fully informed buyer knows exactly the value of
the asset (0 or 1 for the buyer). An uninformed buyer has the following prior. She believes that with
probability p0 the seller has a liquidity shock and the asset is good, i.e., it has a continuation payoff of
1 to the buyer. With probability 1− p0 the asset is bad, and has a continuation payoff of 0. Hence the
informed buyer is willing to buy at any price less than or equal to the true value of the asset, and the
uninformed buyer is willing to buy at any price less than or equal to p0. The probability that a given
buyer is informed is a.
Assume now that the seller has in fact a liquidity shock, and the asset is good. The liquidity shock is
modeled as a ﬂow cost of q for the seller each time period she is unable to trade the asset. Once trade
takes place, the seller realizes a continuation payoff equal to the price, and the ﬂow liquidity cost goes
away. If p is the current price on the market and v(p) is the value function of the seller, then we have





where b is the discount factor of the seller, E is the expectations operator and p0 is the price prevailing
next period. We assume that if an uninformed buyer arrives then the price is p0 (it cannot be more than
that) and if an informed buyer arrives then the price is p1, with p1 > p0. Since both prices are positive,
it is always worth it for the seller to sell if the high-price (informed) buyer comes. Hence v(p1) = p1,
and the Bellman equation implies that
v(p0) = max{−q+b(ap1+(1−a)v(p0)), p0}.
Now the market with the uninformed buyer collapses if
−q+b[ap1+(1−a)v(p0)] > p0.











This is a condition on the underlying parameters of the model and the price p1. As long as it holds,
the market with the uninformed buyer collapses. Thus we have that even though buyers arrive each
period, trade will not necessarily take place, only if the buyer has private information. Assuming
uniform random matching and a large population, informed buyers will arrive at a Poisson rate, with
parameter determined by the percentage of informed buyers in the population, a.
The assumption that the uninformed buyer charges exactly p0 is not necessary. She will not pay
more, and at this price it is already not worth it for the seller to trade; hence no trade will take place at
any other price either. Condition (14) therefore guarantees that no trade takes place on the market with
the uninformed buyer whatever the price may be.
We have not pinned down p1, the price that prevails on the market with an informed buyer. As
long as 1 > p1 > p0 and condition (14) holds, it is mutually beneﬁcial for both parties to trade. The
price can be determined by some sort of bargaining process, which determines how to distribute the
gains from trade between the two agents. For the purposes of the present example it is not necessary
to specify the details.
This very simple model demonstrates how trade might become endogenously impossible. The struc-
ture of this model is such that it could be incorporated into the models in the main part of the paper.
However we see no point in doing that as our main focus is more to study the implications of illiquidity
in this paper.
The idea of this model is essentially adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970). The applications of infor-
mational asymmetries to ﬁnancial markets is a recurrent theme in the literature. In particular the fact
that not fully informed traders use price and/or volume as a signal of fundamentals has been explored
in a number of different models, see e.g., Kyle (1985) or Genotte and Leland (1990).
B Numerical Technique
In the numerical solution, we use a discrete-time version of (11) and its liquidity-event counterpart. We
iterate the following Bellman operator on an arbitrary value function until convergence. The resulting
value function is a ﬁxed point of the Bellman operator and hence a solution of the Bellman equation.
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We have chosen day as the unit of time, ensuring that the discrete and the continuous-time case are
approximately equivalent. Even at such a short time horizon we could not abstract from terms of order
dt2, this is why the discrete version of the Bellman equation is much more complicated.
Once m∗
N and m∗
E are given, the above operator is a contraction mapping by Blackwell’s theorem
(see Theorem 3.3 in Stokey and Lucas, 1989), and thus there is a unique ﬁxed point to which the
iteration procedure converges.
We apply a grid search technique to determine m∗
N and m∗
E. For any pair of candidate cash–bond
ratios, we iterate the value functions until convergence, and check if m∗
k indeed maximizes vk(m)/(m+
p)1−q (see (12)) for both k = N,E. If it does, we stop, if not, we pick another pair of m∗s.
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19h MN/(MN+ pBN) ME/(ME+ pBE) Discount Premium
180 6.0% 9.9% 2.7% 0.22
120 8.9% 13.9% 2.8% 0.31
72 12.9% 19.8% 3.8% 0.60
Table 1: The effect of illiquidity on asset demand
g MN/(MN+ pBN) ME/(ME+ pBE) Discount Premium
2 9.9% 12.9% 1.2% 0.08
4 8.9% 13.9% 2.8% 0.31
8 6.9% 13.9% 4.7% 0.70
Table 2: The effect of size of taste shocks on asset demand
µ MN/(MN+ pBN) ME/(ME+ pBE) Discount Premium
0.5 10.9% 19.8% 1.4% 0.28
1 9.9% 16.8% 2.0% 0.31
2 8.9% 13.9% 2.8% 0.31
Table 3: The effect of frequency of liquidity events on asset demand








Figure 1: Premium as a function of r








Figure 2: Premium as a function of expected time until alternative (days = 365/µ)









Figure 3: Premium as a function of expected duration of alternative (days = 365/l)






Figure 4: Premium as a function of expected time until ﬁrst buyer (days = 365/h)
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